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Chapter 1
Green parties and elections  
to the European Parliament, 
1979–2019
Wolfgang Rüdig
Introduction 
he history of green parties in Europe is closely intertwined with 
the history of elections to the European Parliament. When the irst 
direct elections to the European Parliament took place in June 1979, 
the development of green parties in Europe was still in its infancy. 
Only in Belgium and the UK had green parties been formed that 
took part in these elections; but ecological lists, which were the pre-
decessors of green parties, competed in other countries. Despite not 
winning representation, the German Greens were particularly inlu-
enced by the 1979 European elections. Five years later, most partic-
ipating countries had seen the formation of national green parties, 
and the irst Green MEPs from Belgium and Germany were elected. 
Green parties have been represented continuously in the European 
Parliament since 1984. Subsequent years saw Greens from many other 
countries joining their Belgian and German colleagues in the Euro-
pean Parliament. European elections continued to be important for 
party formation in new EU member countries. In the 1980s it was 
the South European countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain), following 
G
E
4  GREENS FOR A BETTER EUROPE
their successful transition to democracies, that became members. 
Green parties did not have a strong role in their national party systems, 
and European elections became an important focus for party develop-
ment. In the 1990s it was the turn of Austria, Finland and Sweden to 
join; green parties were already well established in all three nations 
and provided ongoing support for Greens in the European Parliament. 
he third major addition came in the 2000s, when East-Central Euro-
pean countries (as well as Malta and Cyprus) took part in European 
elections for the irst time. his provided more of a challenge for the 
European Greens, who were keen to establish a strong presence in 
these new member countries. Despite the strong role played by Greens 
in the transition to democracy of the late 1980s and early 1990s, green 
parties had faded away in most countries, with the European focus 
becoming a major element in eforts to revive green politics.
European elections were also of major importance for well-estab-
lished parties in Western Europe. Green parties have tended to do bet-
ter in European than in national elections, in many cases beneitting 
from the unpopularity of national government parties. hus, Euro-
pean elections often provided a welcome spur to the standing of green 
parties in national politics. Such a boost was particularly important in 
countries where the electoral system used in European elections pro-
vided Greens with a better opportunity to win representation than in 
national elections. his, at irst, applied especially to France, where a 
proportional representation system was used from the start (as opposed 
to the majority voting system used at national elections). France was 
joined by the UK when the irst-past-the-post system employed from 
1979 to 1994 was replaced by a proportional representation system 
in 1999. However, there are also cases of opportunities in European 
elections being worse than in national elections. his applies to small 
European countries, who are only allocated a small number of MEPs, 
meaning that the electoral thresholds for winning representation are 
higher in European than in national elections. he Netherlands – a 
country in which European elections majorly inluenced the forma-
tion of its green parties – is one such case.
Finally, the co-operation of green parties in Europe has also been 
greatly inluenced by European elections and the presence of Green 
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MEPs. Starting with the irst informal attempts to coordinate green 
eforts in 1979, this partnership eventually led to the formation of 
the European Green Party (EGP) in 2004. Membership of the EGP 
became a major aspiration in many countries, particularly new EU 
member states. 
With a ive-year cycle of European elections, the last 40 years 
have seen eight parliamentary sessions, with Greens represented in 
seven of them. Each election and each parliament has its own dis-
tinctive features. he irst decade was perhaps the most important 
for European green politics, with major progress in green party for-
mation being made between the 1979 and 1984 elections. Environ-
mental and peace issues were very high on the political agenda in 
that decade and provided a strong basis for party growth. he second 
decade of European Parliaments (1989–99) may be seen as a period 
of further consolidation. By 1989 the formation of green parties had 
essentially been completed in most countries throughout Western 
Europe, although there were some important exceptions (eg France). 
Most of the green parties that competed in the 1989 European elec-
tions still represent green politics in their home countries today. he 
late 1990s also saw the irst entries of green parties into government 
at a national level (in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Italy), 
which resulted in the 1999 elections being fought by these parties 
as government rather than opposition parties for the irst time, with 
some but not all experiencing losses. he third decade (1999–2009) 
saw the entry of new member countries from East-Central Europe. 
Eforts to boost green parties in these new member states proved 
diicult, and it was 2014 before the irst MEPs from Eastern Europe 
(from Hungary and Croatia) were elected. he fourth decade (2009–
19) brought with it new challenges in the form of a major economic 
crisis, with several countries facing extremely harsh austerity poli-
cies, as well as the rise of right-wing parties with euro-sceptic and 
anti-immigration policies. Green parties did particularly well in 
2009 but less so in 2014. he unpopularity of national governments 
was a major factor bolstering green votes, particularly in 2009, while 
green parties that were part of national coalition governments faced 
more diicult elections. 
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he overall results of green parties in European elections are doc-
umented in the appendix at the end of this chapter. he igures show 
the strength of green parties in Northern Europe, in the low coun-
tries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), and in Germany 
and Austria. In addition, the UK has shown consistent support for 
the Greens since 1989. he picture is more patchy in Ireland and 
particularly unstable in France. Southern European countries are 
also a mixed bag in this respect. he Italian Greens started quite 
well but have struggled in recent years; Greens in Greece and Portu-
gal have been represented in some parliaments, and consistently in 
Spain since 2004, but their share of the vote is generally well below 
that achieved in Northern Europe. Even more diicult is the situa-
tion for green parties in East-Central Europe, with only Croatia and 
Hungary sending Green MEPs to Brussels. 
here is a fairly large body of literature on green parties in 
Europe,1 which also includes analyses of their performance in Euro-
pean elections.2 What are the key contributions that elections to 
the European Parliament have made to these parties’ development? 
In the rest of this chapter, I will try to highlight some key aspects 
that have helped, or hindered, the development of green parties in 
Europe.
Helping the establishment of green parties, 1979–89
he introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 
could not have come at a better time for green parties. he 1970s had 
seen the emergence of strong environmental and anti-nuclear (energy) 
movements through much of Western Europe. Limited opportunities 
to inluence governments, particularly on the nuclear issue, had been 
a major impetus for these movements to enter the electoral arena. In 
countries where the anti-nuclear movement had provided the main 
focus, such as France and Germany, there was a strong reluctance 
to embrace what was seen as joining the establishment by forming 
a political party. In France, ad hoc electoral lists had formed to take 
part in parliamentary and presidential elections beginning in 1974. In 
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Germany, electoral and party law made the formation of a political 
party a virtual necessity. With various parties and lists having taken 
part in local and regional elections since 1977, the 1979 European 
elections provided an opportunity to take a step towards an interme-
diate form of organisation: unlike in federal elections, so-called other 
political organisations not constituted as parties were allowed to par-
ticipate at a national level. his provided Petra Kelly and others with 
the chance to bring together a wide range of groups to join the ‘Other 
Political Organisation: he Greens’ and participate in the European 
elections of June 1979. his predecessor of the modern-day Greens, 
which was formally constituted as a party in January 1980, failed to 
win any seats in the European Parliament but gained an unexpected 
bonus via the generous German system of funding political parties 
based on electoral results. Polling 3.2% of the vote qualiied this new 
political force to receive public funding of 4.8 million Deutschmarks. 
his inancial windfall allowed the new party to be set up very quickly, 
with a national oice and permanent staf. Two-thirds of the funds 
were passed on to regional parties, which further boosted the par-
ty’s fortunes with a series of successes in land (state) elections.3 hese 
initial election successes at regional level were quickly followed by a 
breakthrough in the 1983 federal elections. 
Objections to the idea of a green ‘party’ were much stronger in 
France, which meant the formation process took signiicantly longer 
there. he electoral system introduced for European elections in 
France was a proportional representation system with a national 5% 
threshold. his provided small parties with a much better chance 
of gaining representation than the system for national and subna-
tional elections. he 1979 European elections followed the pattern 
of previous elections, with a list called Europe Ecology – which was 
set up speciically for the elections – taking part. Garnering 4.4.% 
of the vote, Europe Ecology narrowly missed the 5% threshold, but 
the potential for a successful green party had been established. he 
candidacy of Brice Lalonde in the 1981 presidential elections gave 
the Greens a further boost. Disappointment over what was seen by 
many as a betrayal of the Greens by new socialist president François 
Mitterrand led to a greater efort to organise electoral participation. 
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he 1984 European elections provided yet another major incentive. 
Various ecological groups agreed to form a party called he Greens 
in January 1984 to present a united front in the European elections. 
However, unity was not achieved: former presidential candidate 
Brice Lalonde failed to join he Greens and decided to ield his own 
list. he green vote in the 1984 elections was thus split. A united 
green list would have passed the 5% threshold comfortably with 
6.7%, but each separate party fell short. his lack of unity and splits 
between diferent groups plagued the French Greens for many years 
afterwards.
In Belgium, the Flemish Greens – known as Agalev – had emerged 
mainly from a left–Catholic movement with counter-cultural ele-
ments, which had been campaigning on environmental, peace and 
social justice issues since 1970. It started taking part in elections in 
1977. Polling 2.3% in Flanders in 1979 established Agalev as the main 
green group in the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium. Greens in the 
French-speaking part of the country – Ecolo – initially struggled 
with competing groups, but the 1979 European elections provided an 
opportunity to unite all ecologist groups in Wallonia under the Ecolo 
heading, with the party polling 5.1%.4 Following their participation 
in the 1979 elections, both parties entered the Belgian Federal Parlia-
ment in 1981 and grew steadily in the 1980s and 1990s.
In the UK, questions of party unity and links to social move-
ments were not a major issue. he party had been formally set up as 
People in 1973: the irst green party in Europe. After changing its 
name to he Ecology Party in 1975, it made its irst major break-
through in the 1979 general election, which took place just before 
the European elections in May. Having managed to ield more than 
50 candidates in order to qualify for the right to a ‘party political 
broadcast’, he Ecology Party succeeded in drawing wider public 
attention to its existence in the election campaign, and membership 
rose dramatically from fewer than 1,000 in 1978 to more than 5,000 
in 1980. Unlike in Germany and France, the European elections did 
not provide a special opportunity to win representation. he inancial 
cost of taking part in the elections was very high, with deposits to be 
paid by each candidate and no system of public funding for political 
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parties in place, and the electoral system was extremely unfavoura-
ble. Contrary to the French model, the British system for European 
elections mirrored the system used for national elections, and MEPs 
in the UK were elected via the irst-past-the-post system in sin-
gle-member constituencies. his rendered the possibility of winning 
any seats a fairly remote one. he Ecology Party made barely a token 
efort to take part and contested just three out of 87 constituencies, 
winning the support of an average of 1% of voters. By 1984 the party 
was contesting 26 constituencies and achieving an average share of 
2.6% of the vote: a small but signiicant improvement.
While there were relatively minor problems with recognising the 
ecological and green lists and parties in the UK, Belgium, France and 
Germany as genuine members of what was emerging as a new ‘green 
party’ family, such consolidation was more diicult for other parties 
in Europe. Even within these parties, there were diferent concepts as 
to what constituted a ‘green’ party. Some emphasised a strictly eco-
logical identity, as was the dominant view in Belgium, France and 
the UK. Others, particularly the German Greens, favoured what 
might be called a left–libertarian view of green politics,5 representing 
the broader new social movements and New Left politics that had 
emerged with the rise of the student movement in the 1960s.
Various New Left parties had managed to establish themselves 
in countries such as the Netherlands, Italy and Denmark well before 
the Greens had appeared on the scene and embraced an environmen-
tal and anti-nuclear agenda. When the ledgling green movement 
looked for possible partners for the 1979 European elections, the 
Dutch and Italian parties expressed their interest and became part 
of the irst attempt to set up a European organisation to coordinate 
the development of green and ‘alternative’/radical parties in Europe.6
In Italy, the Radical Party (originally formed in 1955) had in 
the 1970s campaigned on various left–libertarian issues, but it had 
also taken an active role in opposition to nuclear power. Under 
the charismatic leadership of Marco Pannella, the Radical Party 
had its best electoral result in the Italian general election of 1979, 
held just one week before the European elections, when it polled 
3.5% and won 18 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. he party 
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did slightly better in the European elections, polling 3.7% to elect 
three MEPs.
In the Netherlands, the Radical Party (or Political Party of Rad-
icals, PPR) was formed in 1968 by a group of activists with a left-
wing Catholic background. he party campaigned on left–libertarian, 
environmental and peace issues. As the Dutch electoral system makes 
it fairly easy for small parties to gain representation, with an efec-
tive threshold of just 0.67%, the PPR had no serious problems being 
elected to the Dutch Parliament: by the 1970s it had joined a centre–
left government as a coalition partner. European elections provided 
more of a challenge. With only 25 seats in the European Parliament, 
parties had to win at least 4% of the vote to have a chance of gaining 
representation. he PPR only polled 1.7% in the 1979 European elec-
tions and thus fell far short of that target, as did other small left-wing 
parties such as the Paciist Socialist Party (PSP).
Both the Italian and Dutch Radicals joined the Coordination 
of European Green and Radical Parties that was set up after the 
1979 elections. However, the involvement of radical parties proved 
diicult. he Italian Radicals displayed little interest in building up 
any formal structure, preferring instead to concentrate on campaigns 
for individual issues. heir involvement proved to be short lived, and 
the party did not become a predecessor of green parties in Italy. In 
the Dutch case, the development was somewhat diferent. he idea 
of several left-wing parties co-operating had been discussed already 
in the 1970s, and the conditions for contesting European elections 
provided a further incentive. he political project that took shape 
in the run-up to the 1984 European elections was an electoral alli-
ance between the PPR and two other small left-wing parties – the 
PSP mentioned above and the Communist Party of the Netherlands 
(CPN) – called the Green Progressive Accord (GPA). his was highly 
controversial; a rival party called he Greens was set up to com-
pete with the GPA in the 1984 European elections (as the Euro-
pean Greens). Internationally, while the German Greens supported 
the GPA, other green parties favoured he Greens. However, he 
Greens only polled 1.3% and failed to win any seats, while the GPA 
won 5.6% of the vote, electing two MEPs. he split between the two 
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parties was never resolved; the GPA became the predecessor of the 
GreenLeft party that was eventually founded in 1990 and accepted 
as a genuine Dutch green party.
Another case in which the presence of left–libertarian parties 
provided an obstacle to the development of green parties was 
Denmark. Here, several established parties – in particular the 
Left Socialists (VS), who had led the Danish anti-nuclear move-
ment, and the Socialist People’s Party (SP) – competed for green 
votes. A separate green party was formed in 1983 but failed to win 
enough support even to appear on the ballot paper.7 he Greens 
never managed to take part in any European elections. Eventually, 
following a path similar to that of GreenLeft, the SP became part 
of the European green party family in the late 2000s. A number 
of other green parties had formed in the early 1980s in Sweden, 
the Republic of Ireland, Portugal and Spain. he 1984 European 
elections (including the 1987 elections taking place in the new 
member states of Portugal and Spain) saw green parties competing 
in eight out of 11 member states as well as the election of the irst 
Green MEPs in Belgium and Germany, plus two MEPs from the 
GPA in the Netherlands. 
Given the failure to integrate radical parties and the strong con-
troversy regarding the situation in the Netherlands, the majority 
of green parties originally wanted to move ahead with a European 
organisation limited to green parties on a more exclusive basis. he 
founding members of the European Green Coordination in 1983 
came from Belgium, France, the UK, the Republic of Ireland and 
Sweden: the German Greens were not included. However, the rela-
tive weakness of these parties, and the wish to include the German 
Greens – who continued to support the idea of including alternative 
and radical parties – eventually led to the need to form technical alli-
ances. Within the European Parliament, green party MEPs became 
part of the Rainbow Group that includes MEPs from regional par-
ties and anti-EU Danish MEPs. he Green–Alternative Europe 
Link (GRAEL) was set up as a subgroup: this included Belgian and 
German Green MEPs as well as MEPs from the Dutch GPA. As 
the 1980s progressed, the intensity of the conlict surrounding the 
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GPA inally receded, and the German Greens were admitted into the 
Coordination in 1987.
Growth and consolidation, 1989–99
he political conditions for green parties in the 1980s continued to 
be favourable. Following the boost that the peace movement of the 
early 1980s had provided to many green parties, the nuclear accident 
at Chernobyl in 1986 led to a revival of anti-nuclear protests in many 
Western European countries. he rise of global environmental issues 
– the threat of a hole in the ozone layer, detected in 1985, followed 
by increasing concerns about climate change – created a political 
agenda on which the environment was placed very highly, often for 
the irst time. he 1989 European elections in many countries were 
thus predominantly fought on environmental issues, and green par-
ties made further strides forward.
Green parties contested elections in ten out of 11 member states, 
with Denmark being the only country with no green party on the 
ballot paper. Among the three countries with green representation in 
the European Parliament in 1984, the Greens did particularly well 
in Belgium. he German Greens only narrowly improved on their 
result. In the Netherlands, the electoral alliance of left-wing parties 
again competed, this time under the label ‘Rainbow’, and margin-
ally increased its support.
he big success stories were the UK and France. In the UK, the 
Green Party had the resources to use the European elections as an 
opportunity to raise its proile. For the irst time, it was competing 
in all constituencies in the hope that a strong showing would help 
in national elections. he situation was extremely favourable for the 
Greens. Environmental issues had for the irst time become very 
important, not least due to Prime Minister Margaret hatcher’s eforts 
to highlight the threat of climate change in 1988. Saturation media 
coverage of environmental issues, also the result of a series of environ-
mental scandals following the privatisation of the water industry in 
England and Wales, contributed to this heightened public attention. 
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he Greens also beneitted from the crisis of the Liberal party, which 
had traditionally been the main establishment party campaigning on 
environmental issues. After the merger of the Liberals with the less 
environmentally friendly Social Democratic Party in 1988, the new 
Liberal Democrats party had not succeeded in establishing its iden-
tity. he Greens managed to win support from across the political 
spectrum, including from former Conservative supporters, and polled 
14.5% in the UK. At the time, this was the highest share of the vote 
ever achieved by a green party in an election at the national level. 
However, despite this unprecedented electoral success, the irst-past-
the-post system meant that not a single Green MEP was elected. And 
while the party experienced a major surge in membership, it was una-
ble to translate that into a breakthrough in the UK general election.8
In France, the Greens had inally overcome their divisions – at 
least temporarily – and presented only one green list in the European 
elections. With 10.6% of the vote and nine MEPs elected, the French 
Greens also had high hopes of translating their result into success 
at the national level. As concerns over nuclear power and climate 
change were less salient in France, it was increased disillusionment 
with the Socialist government that provided the major spur for the 
Greens. With Socialist voters seeking to send a message to President 
Mitterrand but reluctant to vote for a party on the right, the Greens 
were in a perfect position to win over Socialist protest voters. How-
ever, as in the UK, hopes of a European success being the starting 
point for a breakthrough at the national level were disappointed. 
With all green groups joining forces in the legislative elections of 
1993, the opinion polls were at irst extremely promising, raising 
Greens’ hopes of winning representation in the National Assembly 
and potentially exerting inluence on government formation. How-
ever, the bipolar French system provided a major obstacle to this. By 
presenting itself as neither a left- nor a right-wing party, the Greens 
sufered the same fate as many other eforts to overcome the left–
right divide in the Fifth Republic; despite polling a record 7% in the 
irst round, the Greens did not win a single seat.
he issue of competition from rival green parties and lists also 
plagued green politics in several other countries. In Italy, a number 
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of local and regional green parties had been emerging since the early 
1980s. he formation of a national party proved to be rather dii-
cult. he Federation of Greens Lists was formed in 1986 and won 
seats in the Italian Chamber of Deputies in 1987. Shortly before the 
1989 European elections, the Rainbow Greens was formed, mainly 
by former members of the Radicals and other left-wing parties. Both 
the Federation and the Rainbow Greens competed with each other. 
Given the Italian proportional representation system’s very low 
efective threshold, both parties managed to elect MEPs with 3.8% 
and 2.4% of the vote, respectively. hey soon afterwards merged to 
form the Federation of the Greens in 1990. However, any hopes for 
a major boost to the party have since been dashed, as the 1989 result 
(in terms of vote share) remains to this day the best achieved by 
Italian green parties in any national election.
Green parties also competed in the elections of other South Euro-
pean countries. In Greece, several small parties took part but did 
not come close to winning representation. he situation in Spain 
continued to be particularly complex, with a number of regional and 
national formations competing against one other. In Portugal, the 
Green Party continued to compete in elections as part of an elec-
toral alliance with the Communist Party, and in 1989 had one MEP 
elected. his would prove to be the irst and only occasion on which 
the Portuguese Greens were represented in the European Parliament. 
While the potential green vote that could be mobilised in poorer 
South European countries was fairly low, the situation was com-
pletely diferent in the EU’s most aluent member state: Luxem-
bourg. Here, an alternative list had competed in the 1979 election 
and that contributed to the formation of the Green Alternative Party 
(GAP) in 1983, which almost immediately won two seats in the 
national parliament and also competed in the European elections, 
winning a creditable 6.1% of the votes. As Luxembourg (being a 
small country) only sent six MEPs to Brussels, this was not suicient 
to win representation. Also, fractures emerged within the party, sim-
ilar to those experienced in the Dutch case, between a left-wing fac-
tion and a rival group committed to a more ecological identity. his 
led to the formation of a new green party, the Green List Ecological 
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Initiative (GLEI), and both parties competed with each other in the 
1989 European elections. While both had enough support to win 
representation in that year’s national parliamentary election, neither 
party had an MEP elected. It was only once this split was overcome 
in the 1990s that the Luxembourg Greens started to be represented 
in the European Parliament as well.9 
he 1989 elections were a major breakthrough for the Greens, 
who saw 28 MEPs elected that year. At a European level, the Greens 
were now strong enough to form their own parliamentary group, 
he Green Group, in the European Parliament; this had 31 members 
after two MEPs from small Italian parties and one Basque MEP were 
also admitted. In 1993, the European Federation of Green Parties 
was formed to improve the co-operation of green parties in Europe. 
Being admitted as a member of the Federation in subsequent years 
became an important stepping stone for aspiring green parties want-
ing to be recognised as genuine members of the green party family. 
Based on a strong performance in the 1989 elections, there 
were high hopes that further progress would be made in the 1990s. 
he 1994 elections saw some successes, but these were marred by 
serious setbacks. he general context was slightly less favourable. 
Economic conditions had worsened in many countries in the early 
1990s, and the saliency of environmental issues had faded somewhat 
since 1989. Also, setbacks at the national level had knock-on efects 
for European results. hese particularly afected results in the UK 
and France, the big winners of 1989. he disappointed ambition of 
making a breakthrough in the national elections of 1992 and 1993, 
respectively, had delated green enthusiasm. he French Greens were 
again facing the problem of rival lists competing. In a repeat of ten 
years earlier, the Greens were being challenged by a rival green party 
led by Brice Lalonde. Together, the parties managed to get 5%, but 
separately they ended up with no seats. he German Greens had 
their own national disaster in the irst election of a newly uniied 
Germany in 1990, when they failed to win any seats in West Ger-
many. An all-German green party, called Alliance ’90/he Greens, 
was formed in 1993, and the 1994 European elections constituted its 
irst national electoral test. he Greens did very well, gaining 10.1% 
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of the vote: a clear sign that German voters were willing to support 
the new party, which a few months later entered the Bundestag again. 
Other countries previously plagued by rivalries that showed signs 
of recovery were the Netherlands and Luxembourg. he Dutch left-
wing parties that had formed electoral alliances in 1984 and 1989 
inally agreed to merge into a new party, GreenLeft, in 1990. hey 
comfortably won representation again, despite continued compe-
tition from the Greens, who again failed to make an impact. In 
Luxembourg, the split that emerged in 1984 had been healed, with 
both parties forming a joint list and electing their irst Green MEP. 
Otherwise, the Irish Greens were the main newcomer, electing two 
MEPs for the irst time.
A further boost to the Greens’ fortunes was expected from green 
parties in Northern Europe, where Sweden and Finland had joined 
the EU together with Austria. Sweden and Finland had well-estab-
lished green parties, and there had not been the divisions and splits 
experienced in other countries here. he Austrian Greens had gone 
through a period of rival lists in the 1980s, but this had been over-
come. In elections taking place between 1995 and 1996, all three 
parties were successful in electing Green MEPs, with the Swedish 
result standing out as a new record: 17.2%. he Swedish Greens had 
mainly campaigned on an anti-EU platform and had attracted many 
anti-establishment voters protesting against the main parties of both 
the left and right that had brought Sweden into the EU. he Swedes’ 
success was welcome, but it injected a stronger euro-sceptic note into 
the European Greens, opening up a major divide between enthusiastic 
pro-EU parties and those more sceptical about further European inte-
gration, such as the Danish and, to a lesser extent, the British Greens.10
he overall aim of the 1994 elections, despite taking place under 
more diicult circumstances, was to conirm the advances made 
in 1989. his was undoubtedly achieved. Greens by the mid-1990s 
had successfully established themselves in many party systems. As a 
result, green parties were soon increasingly considered as coalition 
partners in government. Starting with the Finnish Greens in 1995, 
green parties were to enter government in several major Western 
European countries, and the 1999 European elections were to be the 
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irst in which many green parties would ight as government rather 
than opposition parties.
Facing new challenges: government and East-Central  
Europe, 1999–2009
One explanation for the success green parties have been enjoying 
in European elections is the theory of ‘second-order’ elections.11 As 
no government is elected in European elections and most voters do 
not expect the outcome to afect their lives, the elections could be 
viewed as a popularity contest. his would make it more likely that 
government parties would sufer losses, and voters might be more 
willing than in national parliamentary elections to cast their votes 
for smaller parties. As turnout is generally lower in European than in 
national elections, dedicated supporters of small parties might make 
more of an impact in this forum. he Greens could be seen as having 
beneitted from these conditions, attracting many voters who might 
otherwise have shunned giving their support to new and small par-
ties in national elections.
With green parties becoming established and joining govern-
ment coalitions at a national level in Finland, Italy, France, Ger-
many and Belgium in the late 1990s,12 the conditions for some 
green parties changed, making it more diicult for them to ben-
eit from the second-order nature of European elections. he irst 
test under these new conditions was faced by the Finnish Greens, 
who had entered national government in 1995 after polling 6.5% 
in the national election; the party improved on this result in the 
next European elections in Finland (1996), garnering 7.6% of the 
vote. he Finnish Greens continued their role in government after 
1999 and, again, the party improved on its national parliamen-
tary election result of 7.3%, achieved in March 1999, with a record 
result of 13.4% in the European election of June 1999. At least for 
the Finnish Greens, the theory of second-order elections does not 
seem to apply. Here, the Greens appear to have beneitted from 
the popularity of their lead candidate as well as misgivings about 
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the record of the Greens’ coalition partners.13 In 2002, the Finn-
ish Greens decided to leave the government after losing a parlia-
mentary vote on the construction of a new nuclear power station. 
he 2004 European elections thus provided a test of whether the 
electorate approved of that decision – with 10.4% of the vote, the 
Greens did creditably well.
he second party to enter a national coalition government was 
the Italian Greens in 1996, as part of the left-wing Olive Tree coa-
lition. Following a change in the electoral system in the early 1990s 
that limited the role of proportional representation, the Italian party 
system saw a right- and a left-wing bloc compete for power: the 
Greens became part of the latter. heir participation in government 
was, however, quite controversial. In particular, the party’s support 
of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) action in Kosovo 
proved unpopular and led to the Greens only polling 1.3% in the 
1999 European elections. he Greens’ role in government came to 
an end in 2001, and their performance as an opposition party in the 
2004 European elections did not constitute a major improvement, 
earning them just 2.5% of the vote.
he third green party to join the government was the French 
Greens. After a disappointing result in the 1993 legislative elections, 
there was a debate in the party over whether to abandon the policy of 
not becoming involved with either the right- or left-wing blocs that 
were competing for power. In 1995, the majority of members opted 
to seek an electoral alliance with the Socialist Party. Weakened by the 
legacy of the Mitterrand presidency, the Socialists agreed to form the 
so-called Plural Left, a partial electoral alliance of centre–left parties. 
he Plural Left won the legislative elections of 1997, and the Greens 
found themselves with not only representation in the National Assem-
bly for the irst time, but also an invitation straight into government. 
With the proportional electoral system used for European elections, 
the Greens could run on their own in 1999; they found the electorate 
appreciative of their decision, winning 9.7% of the vote and electing 
seven MEPs. After the Socialists lost the 2002 presidential and legis-
lative elections, the Greens returned to opposition and polled 7.2% in 
the 2004 European elections. 
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So far, we have seen two cases in which green parties did quite 
well after entering government, and one in which the Greens fared 
less well. he two cases to which we now turn, Germany and Bel-
gium, provide further contrasting experiences. he German Greens 
entered a coalition government with the Social Democrats in 1998. 
he party was caught in strong conlicts with its coalition partner; 
in particular, plans to phase out nuclear power and the decision for 
Germany to become involved in NATO action against Serbia were 
very controversial, causing severe frictions within the party. As a 
result, the German Greens lost voters in every election they stood for 
between 1998 and 2002. he 1999 result was a case in point, which 
saw them polling their worst result since 1979 (6.4%). After being 
re-elected in 2002, the Greens’ fortunes improved. All major contro-
versies had been resolved by then, and the green electorate appeared 
to support this less adversarial approach. he German Greens recov-
ered to achieve a new record result, 11.9%, in 2004. 
he Belgian Greens had the reverse experience. In the 1999 
European elections they still fought as an opposition party, beneit-
ting from various environmental scandals and cases of government 
incompetence to poll a record 16%. he federal elections were held 
on the same day, and with Agalev polling 11% and Ecolo 18.2%, 
the two green parties formed a coalition with the liberal and social-
ist parties. he experience of government was, however, less than 
positive. A combination of ministerial incompetence and divisions 
between the two green parties led to electoral disaster in 2003, with 
both parties sufering major losses and Agalev failing to win rep-
resentation for the irst time since 1981. he 2004 elections thus 
provided an indication of the extent to which both parties had recov-
ered: the Greens had lost almost half of their voters from 1999 but 
still returned two MEPs with 8.7%.
Green parties without a background in government also had 
some mixed experiences. he GreenLeft in the Netherlands achieved 
its best ever result (11.9%), credited in part to the charistmatic 
leadership of Paul Rosenmöller. he Austrian Greens improved 
their result, while the Greens in Luxembourg maintained their 
position. he Swedish Greens could not repeat their sensational 
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performance of 1994, but they still achieved a creditable result of 
just below 10%. 
here was one important change in the UK that added to the 
number of Green MEPs elected. Following the election of a Labour 
government in 1997, the electoral law for European elections was 
changed to bring in a form of proportional representation. he 
country was divided into 12 regions, nine in England plus Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. he change did not afect Northern 
Ireland, which continued to elect MEPs by single transferable vote 
(STV). Proportionality was applied within each region, rather than 
nationally. he size of the constituencies – particularly in Southern 
England, where Greens could expect to do particularly well (with 
11 and 10 seats available in the South East and London, respec-
tively) – gave Greens the chance to have their irst MEPs elected. 
Polling 7.7% in London and 7.4% in the South East was suicient 
to elect the irst two MEPs from the UK: Caroline Lucas and Jean 
Lambert.14 he Green Party of England and Wales was represented 
continuously between 1999 and 2019. 
Overall, 1999 was a good year for the Greens, with 38 MEPs 
elected: a new record. In the European Parliament, there was a 
change of organisation; this saw the Greens joining forces with the 
European Free Alliance (EFA), which consisted mainly of regional 
parties. he Greens–EFA mustered 48 MEPs and thus became the 
fourth largest group in the European Parliament. At the party level, 
the European Federation was replaced by the EGP in 2004. 
Such a shift was timely and helped prepare the Greens for a major 
change to the shape of European politics: this came in the form of 
12 new countries joining the EU, who took part in European elec-
tions for the irst time in 2004 (2007 for Bulgaria and Romania). 
his proved to be a signiicant challenge for the Greens. he record 
of green parties in East-Central Europe had been quite promising 
during the transition phase from communism to liberal democracy. 
Green parties had been formed in several countries and in many had 
played an important role in their irst democratically elected gov-
ernments.15 After these transitions were completed, however, most 
green parties disappeared rapidly from the political scene. he severe 
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economic hardship experienced by Eastern Europe in the 1990s 
was a large contributor to this, changing the agenda completely 
and pushing environmental concerns into the background. In most 
countries, green parties had vanished as serious political contenders 
by the time of the EU accession in the early 2000s.
For Western green parties, who had welcomed the EU’s enlarge-
ment with open arms, the prospect of inding partners in East-
ern Europe in the early 2000s proved a daunting prospect. What 
remained of the green movements and parties of the transition phase 
was generally very weak but still sometimes regarded as politically 
problematical. Green activists of the 1980s often had backgrounds 
in the natural sciences and engineering, and their expertise in 
environmental matters was an important element of their success; 
however, this proile led them to appear as mere ‘environmentalists’ 
and unpolitical in Western eyes. Also, the green parties of Eastern 
Europe often did not share the libertarian–left agenda of Western 
green parties. Many were strongly in favour of the free market and 
embraced a neoliberal economic agenda. In some countries, envi-
ronmental politics had become closely linked with nationalist move-
ments and agendas. his jarred with the multicultural approach of 
Western Greens, in which the protection of minority rights plays a 
very important role. In other cases, green parties teamed up with 
communist successor parties, or were deemed to have become vehi-
cles for the interests of ‘oligarchs’ or other established interests.
One of the green survivors of the transition phase were the Lat-
vian Greens.16 heir record was quite impressive, having maintained 
a role in government for many years (1993–8 and 2002–11). hey 
were also the irst green party to hold the post of prime minister: 
Indulis Emsis was head of an interim government from March to 
December 2004. In 1998 the Greens joined with the Latvian Farm-
ers’ Union to form the Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS). After 
the ZZS had polled 9.5% in the 2002 national parliamentary elec-
tions, receiving a share of 4.3% in the European elections at the time 
of Emsis’s premiership was rather disappointing. he ZZS failed to 
win representation. Other green parties that were founded during 
the transition phase still existed in Bulgaria and Romania, but with 
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support below 1%, their role in European elections (held in 2007) 
remained very marginal.
he European Greens were more hopeful about green parties in 
Poland and the Czech Republic.17 In Poland, a number of parties 
claiming to be green had existed in the early 1990s, but they had long 
since faded away. Environmental activists associated with the Soli-
darity movement became involved with the Freedom Union, which 
was in government in the 1990s before losing representation. With 
the support of the European Greens, a new party called Greens 2004 
was formed in September 2003 to take part in the 2004 European 
elections. Greens  2004 also involved feminist activists; it was thus 
not narrowly environmental in its views, but displayed features akin 
to those found in post-materialist Western European green parties. 
he 2004 European elections proved to be a diicult beginning for 
the new party: it only managed to ield candidates in three of the 
13 European constituencies (Warsaw, Silesia and Lower Silesia), and 
its national result of just 0.27% was an obvious disappointment. he 
Greens persevered but ultimately failed to make an impact at local or 
parliamentary elections. 
A green party existed in the Czech Republic in the early 1990s 
but had become discredited by claims of having links with the old 
communist regime. he Greens were revived just in time for the 
2004 European elections by a range of environmental nongovern-
mental organisation (NGO) activists and intellectuals. While this 
relaunch brought the Greens back from complete obscurity, their 
2004 European election result of 3.2% was disappointing. However, 
the party entered the national parliament in 2006 to join the Czech 
government as a coalition partner.
In other new member states, green parties participated in the elec-
tions as part of electoral alliances in Slovakia and Slovenia but failed 
to make a major impact. Greens in the Mediterranean states of Cyprus 
and Malta also failed to elect any MEPs. he Cyprus Greens were fairly 
small, polling less than 1%. he green party in Malta, the Alternative 
Democrats, formed in 1989 but had found it diicult to undercut 
the dominance of the two major parties, Labour and the Nationalist 
Party. Having polled between 1% and 2% in national elections, their 
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2004 result of 9.3% was a huge success for the party, although it was 
not suicient for an MEP to be elected. A major factor in this outcome 
was the popularity of party leader Arnold Cassola, who had been very 
prominent in the campaign for EU membership.18
Another success in Southern Europe was the irst election of 
Green MEPs from Spain: in both cases, green parties had formed 
joint lists with larger parties. he Confederation of the Greens 
formed an alliance with the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and had 
one MEP elected. he Catalan ICV stood in an electoral alliance 
with the United Left (IU) and also had one MEP elected.
Overall, the 2004 European elections were a success for the Greens. 
hese were the largest European elections thus far, involving 25 coun-
tries (with Bulgaria and Romania added in 2007). he Greens gener-
ally weathered this period of government involvement well, and the 
irst MEPs were elected in Spain and the UK. However, the elections 
also revealed the problems being faced by those attempting to establish 
successful green parties in East-Central Europe.
Austerity and populism, 2009–19
he global inancial crisis that emerged in 2008 had a profound efect 
on the politics of the following decade, with policies of economic 
austerity becoming dominant in many European countries. It was a 
struggle for environmental issues to stay visible in this context. he 
2010s also saw the rise of populist right-wing parties campaigning on 
immigration issues and opposition to the EU as well as promoting 
scepticism about climate change and rolling back environmental regu-
lation. Austerity and the emergence of the extreme right provided the 
major challenges to green politics during this time.
At the time of the 2009 European elections, the full nature of the 
crisis and its resultant policies of austerity were yet to unfold fully, 
but the elections were nonetheless dominated by the threat of serious 
economic and social problems. A further complication was that green 
parties in several countries had joined national coalition governments, 
and – unlike in the 1990s – often with centre-right coalition partners. 
24  GREENS FOR A BETTER EUROPE
his placed some green parties in positions of accountability with 
regard to the economic crisis and its ensuing austerity measures.
An early sign of problems for green parties associated with the 
economic crisis was the result in the Republic of Ireland. he Greens 
had entered a government coalition with the conservative Fianna 
Fáil party in 2007.19 he Republic of Ireland was hit very hard by 
the inancial crisis, and severe measures including radical austerity 
policies were taken in 2008. While no direct responsibility for the 
inancial crisis could possibly be attributed to the Greens, the party 
got caught up in public outrage over the policies adopted. he 2009 
European elections were thus fought under a cloud of austerity. he 
party only fought two of the four constituencies and polled just 
1.9%, losing representation in the European Parliament. Dramatic 
losses were also experienced in local elections on the same day. he 
Greens carried on in government until 2011, when they lost all rep-
resentation in the Irish Parliament. 
Another case where a green party in government was negatively 
afected by the economic crisis is Latvia. he country was very badly 
afected by the global economic crisis and adopted radical austerity 
policies. he 2009 European elections were a irst electoral test for 
the government after the crisis. Shortly before the European elec-
tions, in March 2009 the government collapsed. he Greens did not 
play a role in this collapse, but in the prevailing economic climate 
it was more diicult for the party to gain a hearing for ecological 
issues. he ZZS polled just 3.7% and again failed to earn enough 
votes to win representation. 
A further case of government participation having a negative 
efect on electoral performance is the Czech Republic. Here, the 
Greens had entered a national coalition government in 2006 under 
a new leader, Martin Bursík. He won the leadership in 2005 despite 
resistance from the group of environmental activists who had suc-
cessfully relaunched the party in the early 2000s. Bursík had been a 
member of other parties before and was seen as a charismatic leader 
with the media experience to promote the party more efectively. 
he Greens entered the Czech Parliament for the irst time in 2006 
with 6.2% of the vote and formed a coalition with two conservative 
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parties, but internal opposition to government participation became 
a major problem. Alongside concern over the neoliberal economic 
policies pursued by the government, opposition to Bursík’s lead-
ership tore the party apart. After two Green MPs were expelled 
from the party, the coalition collapsed in March 2009. Two rival 
parties were formed to compete with the Greens in the European 
elections of June 2009, but none of them came close to winning 
representation: the Greens only polled 2.1%, and did little better in 
the national elections of 2010.20 he experience of participation in 
government on this occasion proved to have a negative efect on the 
party’s development. 
Looking at other cases of green parties entering the 2009 elec-
tions following a period in national oice, the Italian Greens had 
entered government again in 2006 as part of another broad cen-
tre–left electoral alliance called he Union. However, that govern-
ment was very unstable and had collapsed by 2008. In the subse-
quent parliamentary election, the Greens were excluded from the 
main left-wing alliance and had to join a group dominated by two 
communist parties (the Rainbow Left), but they failed to re-enter 
parliament. he Greens thus entered the 2009 European elections 
from a position of weakness: this had little to do with the work 
they had done in government but was a result of the division of the 
Italian left and its failure to create a viable alternative to the right. 
In 2009 the Greens joined an alliance of New Left parties called 
Left Ecology Freedom. Gaining 3.1% of the vote, the list failed to 
win the 4% necessary to guarantee representation.
A contrary example to these cases of governments having an adverse 
efect on electoral performance is provided by Finland. he Finnish 
Greens had re-entered government in 2007 in a coalition led by right-
wing parties. he European election of 2009 was the irst electoral test 
of the new government. Fielding two very strong candidates (Heidi 
Hautala and Satu Hassi), who had played a leading role in Finnish 
green politics, the Greens did very well, with a result of 12.4% elect-
ing two MEPs. Environmental issues played some role in the party’s 
campaign and, as before, green voters were obviously not put of by the 
Greens’ participation in government, even with conservative parties. 
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Looking at other countries, the pattern of previous years was essen-
tially repeated in this period. In general, the green parties of East-Cen-
tral Europe did not do particularly well, while the green parties of 
more aluent Northern Europe maintained their strong position. In 
Southern Europe, the share of the vote was, again, fairly low, but the 
Greek Greens had some success. Following devastating forest ires in 
2007 and a wave of riots directed against the political establishment in 
2008, the Greens briely became a force to be reckoned with, and the 
irst Greek Green MEP was elected with 3.5% of the vote.21
he one outstanding result of 2009 was achieved in France, which 
elected 14 Green MPs with 16.3% of the vote. his French case has 
some unusual features. he success had been achieved by a list called 
Europe Ecology,22 which was the brainchild of Daniel Cohn-Bendit. 
After achieving fame as the leader of the 1968 student movement in 
Paris, he was forced to leave France and came to play an important 
role in the German Green party. After steering the French Greens to 
their 1999 European election success, Cohn-Bendit became leader of 
the Green parliamentary group in the European Parliament. He was 
re-elected in 2004 on the list of the German Greens but expressed 
his interest in returning to the French political scene in early 2008. 
At that time, the French Greens faced a major internal crisis, mainly 
stemming from renewed discussions about its relationship with the 
Socialist Party. In opposition since 2002, the Greens had refused to 
enter a new electoral alliance with the Socialists in the 2007 legisla-
tive elections, and there was concern that the party was turning into 
a more ‘fundamentalist’ force. Cohn-Bendit had been a close ally of 
the German Greens’ long-time ‘virtual’ leader, Joschka Fischer, and 
shared Fischer’s reformist vision of green politics as the art of the 
possible; this put him at odds with the French Greens’ new funda-
mentalist tendencies. 
To help renew the French Greens, Cohn-Bendit’s vision was to 
include people from outside of the green party, from civil society and 
other political movements. He managed to recruit prominent activists 
from civil rights and anti-globalisation movements, such as Eva Joly 
and José Bové, to a new movement called Ecology Europe. Politically, 
Cohn-Bendit sought to create a more centrist force, unburdened by 
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the chronic divisions typical of far-left groups in France. However, 
Cohn-Bendit’s initiative also included a threat to basic elements of 
green politics, such as grassroots democracy and the power of party 
activists to determine the party’s development. In fact, Cohn-Bendit’s 
vision featured major elements of an ‘anti-party’ attitude; he expected 
the Greens to eventually disband and be replaced by some kind of 
‘green collective’. However, given their weakness in previous years as 
well as Cohn-Bendit’s charismatic personality and the outstanding 
role he had played in green politics over many decades, the Greens 
decided to go along with his initiative nevertheless. An agreement was 
reached by the Greens and Europe Ecology to run under the latter’s 
name, but with half of all candidates being selected by the Greens and 
the other half being nominated by Europe Ecology, which included 
prominent recruits that Cohn-Bendit had collected from civic groups 
outside of green politics. he experiment worked: Europe Ecology was 
tremendously successful. 
he case of Europe Ecology is a prominent example of European 
elections being used for what might be termed political experiments. 
Some critics saw this initiative as introducing a kind of green ‘celeb-
rity’ politics, with democratic internal procedures being replaced by 
the choice of a charismatic leader. he efect of the 2009 ‘experiment’ 
on the post-election phase was, however, less profound. he process 
of selecting candidates from civic society groups continued for the 
regional elections of 2010 but was then abandoned. Both groups 
joined to form a new party, Europe Ecology–he Greens (EELV), in 
2010, and Cohn-Bendit withdrew from participation in 2011. he 
idea of having a nonparty structure in green politics seems to have 
been just an episode.
In the 2014 elections, the European crisis and austerity politics 
dominated the agenda. While the Fukushima nuclear accident in 
2011 had contributed to a temporary electoral boom for green par-
ties (particularly in Germany), by the time of the European elections 
environmental issues were marginalised. he Greens only won 38 
seats in 2014, compared with 47 in 2009. Nevertheless, given the 
very unfavourable context, this election result can still be seen as a 
success.
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he results again combined successes with some disappointments. 
he French victories of 2009 could not be repeated. In 2012, the 
French Greens had rejoined the Socialists in government, but they 
became more and more disillusioned with the increasingly right-wing 
nature of the government’s policies and their own lack of inluence. 
he Greens eventually left government again in 2014, shortly before 
the European election, in an attempt to distance themselves from 
the increasingly unpopular Socialists. On this occasion, the Greens 
could not even beneit from the charismatic leadership of Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit, who had retired from active politics. Given all of this, 
their result of 9% can be regarded as a respectable one. 
Other countries with Greens in government at the time of the 
elections included Denmark, Finland, Latvia and Luxembourg. he 
Finnish Green League had previously done well in European elec-
tions, despite their long involvement in government, but this time 
the party sufered some losses. Continuously in government since 
2007, the party had decided to stay, in spite of government decisions 
on nuclear power going against them. Austerity policies also played 
a role. he Left Alliance had departed government in protest against 
these policies, but the Greens had decided to stay. While the Left 
Alliance increased their share of the vote, the Green League experi-
enced some slight losses.
he Danish Socialist People’s Party (SF) had observer status with 
the EGP but decided before the election to apply for full member-
ship. A few months before the elections, it had also decided to leave its 
government coalition over disagreements on what the party regarded 
as neoliberal policies pursued by the Social Democrats. With 11% of 
the vote, the SF lost almost 5 percentage points compared with its 
2000 result.
In Luxembourg, the Greens had entered national government for 
the irst time in 2013 as part of a coalition with Liberals and Social 
Democrats. All government parties lost votes, but green losses were 
fairly minor: they gained 15% of the vote (compared with 16.8% in 
2009). 
In Latvia, the Greens found themselves in government at the 
time of the elections after a brief period in opposition (2011–14). 
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he result of the Union of Greens and Farmers was again lower than 
in national elections but higher than in the previous European elec-
tions. One MEP was elected, but they were a representative of the 
Latvian Farmers’ Union. Later in the year, the Union of Greens and 
Farmers polled 19.5% in the country’s parliamentary elections. In 
2015, Raimonds Vējonis was elected president of Latvia; this is the 
irst time a green party member has held the post of head of state.
Another case where green government involvement played a role, 
this time at a regional level, was Belgium. Here, the Greens were, 
overall, slightly down on the 2009 result, but there was a major dif-
ference between the two green parties. While the Flemish Greens 
improved in their representation, polling 6.7% in Flanders (com-
pared with 4.9% in 2009), Ecolo lost half of its 2009 votes, dropping 
from 8.6% to 4.3%. While the Flemish Greens had not been in gov-
ernment at the regional level, Ecolo appears to have been punished 
for its government involvement, losing voters mainly to a far-left 
party: the Workers’ Party of Belgium.
Among green parties that did not have to defend a record in gov-
ernment, the picture was rather mixed. Greens in Germany and the 
Netherlands experienced slight losses. More serious losses were expe-
rienced in Greece, where the Greens only polled 0.9% and lost their 
MEP. Severe austerity policies had made it diicult for the party to 
make its mark. Italy was not a success story in 2014 either. Monica 
Frassoni, co-chair of the EGP, founded the movement Green Italia, 
which sought to unite people from a variety of political backgrounds, 
from left to right, as well as movement activists, green economic entre-
preneurs and intellectuals. Green Italia and Italy’s green party, the 
Federation of the Greens, entered the European elections on a joint 
list but attracted only 0.9% of the overall vote and secured no MEPs.
here were, however, a number of success stories. In the Republic 
of Ireland, the Greens inally appeared to have recovered from their 
experience in government. Competing in all four constituencies, the 
party polled at 4.9% and narrowly missed having one MEP elected. 
he Greens in Sweden and Austria recorded major successes, with a 
substantial increase in vote share, beneitting from the unpopularity 
of incumbent governments. 
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he Green Party of England and Wales also experienced some 
success. Largely ignored by the media, which preferred to con-
centrate on the euro-sceptic UK Independence Party (UKIP), the 
Greens only sufered minor losses in terms of vote share. A very 
strong performance in South West England nevertheless gave the 
Greens a third representative in the European Parliament: Molly 
Scott Cato. his successful outcome sparked renewed interest in 
the party, leading to a ‘green surge’ in 2014–15. Membership of the 
Green Party of England and Wales stood at around 16,000 before 
the 2014 European elections, but it had risen to 30,900 by the end 
of 2014 and more than doubled during 2015.23 Campaigning on a 
strong anti-austerity platform, the Greens managed to attract many 
former Liberal Democrats voters disafected by the party’s govern-
mental record in coalition with the Conservatives. In the general 
election of May 2015, the Green Party of England and Wales received 
more than one million votes and a share of 3.6%, the best result in its 
history.24 his helped to re-elect its only MP, Caroline Lucas, with an 
increased majority, but any hopes of increasing its representation in 
parliament were disappointed.
he biggest success story of 2014 was that, inally, Green MEPs 
were elected in East-Central Europe. he Hungarian Politics Can 
Be Diferent party (LMP) managed to poll at 5%, which was just 
enough to elect its irst MEP. he LMP probably beneitted from 
the weakness of the Hungarian Socialist Party. In Croatia, which 
was taking part in European elections for the irst time, a new green 
party called Croatian Sustainable Development (ORaH) won a seat 
in the European Parliament with 9.4% of the vote. However, in 
other parts of Eastern Europe there was little for Greens to cheer 
about. he Czech Greens achieved a marginally better result than 
in 2009, polling at 3.8%, but otherwise results below 1% dominate 
the picture.
Overall, 2014 was a diicult election year for the Greens. he 
general trends did not fundamentally difer from previous elections. 
Green parties in Eastern and Southern Europe at the time were less 
successful, while Greens in Northwestern Europe mainly held their 
positions, with speciic national circumstances determining upward 
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or downward trends. he negative efect of government involvement 
was felt more strongly in 2014 than before, with all green parties cam-
paigning as opposition parties and increasing their representation.
Conclusions
What can we learn from the history of green parties’ participation in 
European elections? What inluence, if any, did European elections 
have on the development of green parties? 
he overall pattern of European election results for green parties 
relects the economic and social conditions in each country. here 
is a strong correlation between the level of aluence and the sup-
port for green parties, which consistently do well in the economi-
cally stronger countries of Northern and Western Europe but ind 
it more diicult to win support in the poorer countries of Eastern 
and Southern Europe. Nevertheless, there is considerable variation 
within each group of countries.
Other factors outside the control of green parties include the 
salience of environmental issues and the positioning of rival par-
ties. Environmental issues were clearly the main driving force in 
the 1980s. Environmental scandals such as the forest ires in Greece 
have also helped green parties to win representation in the European 
Parliament. Many green parties have ‘diversiied’ to cover many 
more issues and avoid being labelled ‘single issue’ parties. However, 
surveys show that voters generally associate green parties with ‘the 
environment’,25 and it has been quite diicult for green parties, in 
some countries more than in others, to develop strong issue compe-
tence on nonenvironmental issues. In addition, eforts by established 
parties of both the left and right to lay claim to a ‘green’ identity have 
generally not been very successful.
Several green party successes in European elections may be 
explained, at least in part, with reference to the impact of green party 
leaders. he names Arnold Cassola (Malta), Paul Rosenmöller (the 
Netherlands) and Daniel Cohn-Bendit (France) have been mentioned. 
However, the dominance of charismatic leaders can also provide 
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challenges for green parties. he principles of grassroots democracy 
seem to clash with the idea of green parties adopting popular leaders. 
he case of Europe Ecology as an alternative model for green 
party organisation, promoted by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, is perhaps 
one of the more challenging ideas. he concept of Europe Ecology 
embracing nonparty movements and individuals had its successes in 
2009, but its applicability to other countries and times seems ques-
tionable. Yet, this idea of moving away from a party model is shared 
by Emmanuel Macron and his En Marche movement, which suc-
ceeded in sweeping away the traditional parties of the left and right 
in France: Europe Ecology was perhaps an early forerunner of this 
development. It seems unlikely, however, that a similar model would 
resonate outside of France. 
Charismatic leaders can also be a source of splits in the green 
movement. While this was avoided in France in 2009, competition 
between rival green parties had a devastating efect on the early for-
tunes of the Greens in France, with competing lists preventing green 
parties from winning representation in the European Parliament in 
both 1984 and 1994. Several other countries had more than one 
party claiming to be ‘green’, particularly in the early phases of green 
party development. In the EU, founder members Italy, the Nether-
lands and Luxembourg all saw more than one green party compet-
ing in elections. While these divisions were resolved by mergers in 
Italy and Luxembourg, in the Netherlands both GreenLeft and the 
Greens competed in European elections until 2014, although the 
Greens were the much weaker party and their electoral participation 
had only a negligible efect on GreenLeft.
Within new EU member states, competition between diferent 
green parties has occurred, for example, in Bulgaria and Spain. While 
competition between EGP member parties in 2014 was limited to 
Bulgaria and the Netherlands, green parties also have to contend 
with non-EGP member parties that claim to be ‘green’, in some cases 
as a result of splits within the green party. his occurred in 2014 in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Republic of Ireland. Overall, 
though, divisions within the green party family have generally been 
resolved, and party splits are not a serious issue in most countries.
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European elections had a positive efect on green party devel-
opment when they were associated with the provision of additional 
resources and opportunities. he story of the German Greens ben-
eitting inancially from their participation in the 1979 European 
elections is perhaps fairly unique. More common were the beneits 
green parties could enjoy from taking advantage of the second-order 
character of European elections, in which voters felt more free to vote 
for a party they really preferred, or to cast a protest vote against an 
unpopular government. 
he exact nature of such resource advantages depends, however, 
on the diferent opportunities provided by the electoral systems 
at both a national and European level. he advantages are par-
ticularly clear for countries that employ a majority voting system 
in national elections but a proportional representation system in 
European elections. he French and British Greens (after 1999) 
were the main beneiciaries. his situation is reversed for smaller 
countries, who are allocated a more limited number of seats in 
the European Parliament; even with proportional representation 
in place, the vote share required to win representation can be very 
high, which discourages voters from casting their votes for smaller 
parties, such as the Greens, who have relatively little chance of 
success. In certain circumstances, this situation can provide an 
incentive for smaller parties to join together to form a united green 
party with a chance of clearing the threshold, as was seen in the 
Dutch case.
France and the UK are the only countries in the EU that employ 
a majority electoral system at the national level and a proportional 
representation system at the European level. Small parties such as the 
Greens are severely disadvantaged in national elections in these coun-
tries, and European elections have been used successfully to win rep-
resentation and boost the party’s proile. However, there is a huge con-
trast between the two countries in terms of how electoral success in the 
European elections has been turned into success in national politics. 
he French Greens have had a continuous presence in the National 
Assembly since 1997 and participated in national government from 
1997 to 2002, and again from 2012 to 2014. By comparison, the 
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British Greens had their irst MP elected in 2010 but without any role 
in national government. Why did the major successes of both parties 
in the 1989 European elections lead to such diferent outcomes? 
he key mechanism that allowed the French Greens to make a 
major impact was their entry into an electoral alliance. he French 
Greens’ failure to translate victory in the 1989 European elections 
into success in the national parliamentary elections of 1993 led to a 
debate about their joining an electoral alliance with the Socialist Party. 
he huge success of the British Greens in 1989 did not have a similar 
efect. An alliance with other parties was not on the agenda. his only 
changed after the 2014 European and 2015 general elections, when 
the idea of a ‘progressive alliance’ became a major issue. However, the 
unwillingness of the Labour Party to enter such an alliance in the 2017 
general election provided a huge obstacle.26
Several political factors explain this contrast. In the French elec-
toral system of two rounds, electoral alliances are an integral part of 
electoral politics. In Britain, pre-election alliances are limited to spe-
ciic historical cases (eg the SDP–Liberal Alliance of the 1980s) and 
are not a regular feature of party competition. he Socialist Party was 
in crisis and was eager to set up a broad coalition of left-wing forces 
to counteract the right in parliament. Moreover, candidate selection 
in France is centralised, allowing parties (including the Greens) to 
decide in which constituencies they will ield candidates.27 In Brit-
ain, the selection of green party candidates is exclusively a decision of 
constituency parties, making it far more diicult for national agree-
ments to be made and implemented. However, the French experi-
ence has not been an unmitigated success. As the Socialists knew the 
Greens were dependent on them to ensure representation, they faced 
limited pressure to compromise on key issues. Many Greens were 
disafected by the lack of inluence the party had within the alliance, 
and there was strong opposition to its continuation during the 2000s 
and 2010s. Participation in the Socialist-led government after 2012 
proved to be a frustrating experience, and the Greens decided to 
leave in 2014. 
he role of green parties in national coalition governments has 
been another important element of the experience of Greens in 
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European elections. Green parties can beneit electorally from gov-
ernment participation. However, lack of competence, internal strife 
and the pursuit of unpopular policies such as austerity can have a 
strong negative efect on the electoral performance of green parties, 
in national as well as in European elections. 
How large, then, is the inluence of European elections on 
national politics? Analyses of the ‘Europeanisation’ of parties and 
party systems have generally expressed scepticism about a major 
efect.28 Even in European elections, the national context still 
seems to be dominant. European Parliament debates and decisions 
usually attract very little media coverage, and for many green poli-
ticians, particularly those well established in their home countries, 
interest in European green afairs is often very limited. Green party 
successes in European elections can, but do not necessarily, have a 
positive impact on the fortunes of green parties. Even major suc-
cesses, such as the record green vote in the UK in 1989, do not nec-
essarily translate into success at a national level. It is still national 
institutions and politics that determine the inluence of European 
election results. 
Looking forward to the European elections of 2019, the Greens 
appear to be in a promising position in several of their traditional 
strongholds. On Green Sunday, 14 October 2018, a ‘green wave’ 
swept through Belgium, Luxembourg and Bavaria (Germany). 
Both the Flemish and Walloon Greens scored major successes in 
local elections.29 In Luxembourg, the Greens polled 15.1% in par-
liamentary elections: 5 percentage points up from 2013, when they 
had joined a government coalition with liberals and socialists.30 In 
regional elections in Bavaria, the Greens scored 17.5%, marking an 
increase of 8.9% since 2013. At a federal level, the poll rating of 
the Greens during October 2018 stood at between 16% and 19%, 
up from 8.9% in the federal elections of 2017.31 Greens also appear 
to be doing well in the Netherlands and Finland, but recent elec-
tions have seen setbacks for green parties in Austria, France, Italy 
and Sweden. Increasing support for Greens in the Low Countries 
and in Germany provides a strong basis for continued success in 
European elections.
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Parties and sources
Austria. 1996–2014: Die Grünen–Die Grüne Alternative (he 
Greens–he Green Alternative). URL: https://bit.ly/2F6iqgx
Belgium. 1979–2014: Ecolo and Agalev (renamed Groen! (Green!) 
in 2003 and Groen (Green, without exclamation mark) in 2012). 
URL: https://bit.ly/2yLdgAD. More information, URL: https://bit.
ly/2SaAU5E
Bulgaria. 2007: ȿɝɣɝɥɘɧɘɨɪɠɷ (Green Party); 2009: ȿɝɣɝɥɠɪɝ
(Greens); 2014: ȿɝɣɝɥɘ ɧɘɨɪɠɷ (Green Party) and ȿɝɣɝɥɠɪɝ
(Greens). URL: https://bit.ly/2PaGm6U
Croatia. 2014: Održivi razvoj Hrvatske (Sustainable Development of 
Croatia, OraH). URL: https://bit.ly/2JCYhNv
Cyprus. 2004–9: ǾȑȜȖțĭȃȘșȞȚȧȔȤȜ°ȄįȟȘȓĭȚȚȞȜıȘİıȩȜ (Move-
ment of Ecologists–Environmentalists); 2014: the Cyprus Green 
party, renamed ǾȑȜȖțĭȃȘșȞȚȧȔȤȜ°ȆȡȜįȟȔĭİȑĭȄȞȚȘıȩȜ (Move-
ment of Ecologists–Citizens’ Cooperation), formed an electoral 
alliance with the Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK). URL: 
https://bit.ly/2DjYd5b
Czech Republic. 2004–14: Strana zelených (Green Party, SZ). URL: 
https://bit.ly/1kCLuZV
Denmark. 2009–14: Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People’s Party, 
SF). URLs: https://bit.ly/2AKspE1, https://bit.ly/1tpXHST
Estonia. 2009–14: Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised (Political Party of 
Estonian Greens, ROH). URL: https://bit.ly/2sl222g
Finland. 1996–2014: Vihreä liitto (Green League). URL: https://bit.
ly/2qv6nz4
France. 1979: Europe Écologie (Europe Ecology); 1984: Les Verts (he 
Greens) and Entente Radicale Écologiste (Radical Ecologist Accord, 
ERE); 1989: Les Verts (he Greens); 1994: Les Verts (he Greens) and 
Génération Écologie (Generation Ecology, GE); 1999–2004: Les Verts 
(he Greens); 2009: Europe Écologie (Europe Ecology); 2014: Europe 
Écologie–Les Verts (Europe Ecology–he Greens). URL: https://bit.
ly/2OmuBF8
Germany. 1979–89: West Germany, Die Grünen (he Greens); 
1994–2009: Germany, Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen (Alliance ’90/he 
Greens). URL: https://bit.ly/2ziZ01u
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Greece. 1989: ȃȘșȞȚȧȔȞȘ ǺȜĭȚȚĭșıȘșȞȑ (Alternative Ecologist), 
ǺȚȚȖȜȘșȧǹȖțȞșȟĭıȘșȧȃȘșȞȚȞȔȘșȧǾȑȜȖțĭ (Greek Democratic Eco-
logical Movement) and ȃȘșȞȚȞȔȘșȧǾȑȜȖțĭ°ȄȞȚȘıȘșȐǷȜĭȔȏȜȜȖİȖ 
(Ecological Movement–Political Rebirth); 1994: ǰȜȤİȖȃȘșȞȚȧȔȤȜ 
(Union of Ecologists), ȄȞȚȘıȘșȐ ȃȘșȞȚȞȔȑĭ (Political Ecology) 
and ȃȘșȞȚȞȔȘșȐ ǷȜĭȔȏȜȜȖİȖ (Ecological Renaissance); 1999: 
ȃȘșȞȚȞȔȘșȧ ǺȚȚȖȜȘșȧ (Ecological Greek), ǰȚȚȖȜįȠ ȃȘșȞȚȧȔȞȘ 
(Greek Ecologists) and ȃȘșȞȚȧȔȞȘǺȜĭȚȚĭșıȘșȞȑ (Alternative Ecol-
ogists); 2004–14: ȃȘșȞȚȧȔȞȘȄȟȎİȘȜȞȘ (Ecologists–Greens). URL: 
https://bit.ly/2Cg4cVC
Hungary. 2009: Lehet Más a Politika (Politics Can Be Diferent, 
LMP) and Humanista Párt (Humanist Party, HP) (joint list); 2014: 
LMP. URL: https://bit.ly/2Chr6vw
Ireland. 1984: Comhaontas Glas (he Green Alliance); 1989–2014: 
Comhaontas Glas (he Green Party). URL: https://bit.ly/2P6MFZg
Italy. 1989: Federazione delle Liste Verdi (Federation of Green Lists) 
and Verdi Arcobaleno (Rainbow Greens); 1994–2004: Federazione 
dei Verdi (Federation of the Greens); 2009: Sinistra e Libertà (Left 
and Liberty); 2014: Verdi Europei–Green Italy (Italian Greens–
Green Italy). URL: https://bit.ly/2AIteNG 
Latvia. 2004–14: Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība (Union of Greens and 
Farmers, ZZS), consisting of two parties, Latvijas Zaļā partija (Lat-
vian Green Party, LZP) and Latvijas Zemnieku savienība (Latvian 
Farmers Union, LZS). URL: https://bit.ly/2CfkIFc
Luxembourg. 1979: Alternativ Lëscht Wiert Iech (Alternative List 
Resist, AL); 1984: Gréng Alternativ Partei (Green Alternative Party, 
GAP); 1989: Gréng Lëscht Ekologesch Initiativ (Green List Ecologi-
cal Initiative, GLEI) and Gréng Alternativ Partei (Green Alternative 
Party, GAP) (separate lists); 1994: Gréng Lëscht Ekologesch Initia-
tiv–Gréng Alternativ Partei (Green List Ecological Initiative–Green 
Alternative Party) (joint list); 1999–2014: Déi Greng (he Greens). 
URL: https://bit.ly/2Pz4xeO. More information, URL: https://bit.
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Slovenia. 2004: Stranka mladih Slovenije (Party of the Youth of 
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